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ABSTRACT
The use of smartphones as navigation devices has become more prevalent. The ubiquity of handheld navigation devices such as Garmins or Toms Toms has been falling whereas the ownership of
smartphones and their adoption as GPS devices is growing. This work provides a comprehensive
study of the most popular smartphone mapping applications, namely Google Maps, Apple Maps,
Waze, MapQuest, Bing, and Scout, on both Android and iOS. It details what data was found, where
it was found, and how it was acquired for each application. Based on the findings, the work allowed
for the construction of a tool capable of parsing the data from all of the aforementioned applications
as well as creating maps of the locations attained. It was discovered that much data relating to the
user’s navigation history, be it addresses, latitude longitude points, etc., were stored on the user’s
device. It was also found that in almost all cases, discerning whether the user had actually traveled
to a destination from the mapping application data was not possible.
Keywords: Mapping application forensics, iOS forensics, Android forensics, GPS forensics, Waze
forensics, Google Maps forensics, Apple Maps forensics, MapQuest forensics, Scout forensics, Bing
forensics.

1.

INTRODUCTION

In 2015, global smartphone ownership reached
1.859 billion people. This is expected to rise to
over 2 billion by the end of 2016, and by the end
of 2018 smartphone penetration is projected to
increase to just over 36% of the global population (2.48 billion users) (Statista, 2016). Smartphones have surpassed the ownership level of personal computers and have become a main element of crime scene investigations (Umale, Deshmukh, & Tambhakhe, 2014). McMillan, Glisson, and Bromby (2013) conducted research in
the United Kingdom which illustrated the rise of
criminal activities involving smartphones at an
c 2017 ADFSL

average rate of growth of ten cases per year from
2006 to 2011.
A segment of applications that has gone
largely unnoticed by the research community is
that of mapping applications. Paralleled with
the increase in smartphone adoption as navigation devices has been the decrease in the use
of hand-held navigation devices like Garmins
(Statista, 2012). In the United States alone,
Google Maps and Apple Maps, have 64.5 and 42
million users, respectively (Buczkowski, 2014),
while the remaining applications seen in Table 1
account for around a total of 50 million users
(Cohan, 2013). Worldwide, both Google Maps
(46.7%) and Apple Maps (26.2%) have signifiPage 15
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cant penetration in the mobile domain (Statista,
2015).
The nature of mapping applications, navigating a user to a destination, directing users around
traffic, etc., makes them likely to hold data on
where the user has been, what time they were
there, their traveling tendencies, etc., some even
offer chatting services with other users (see Table 2). It is apparent why data such as this may
be of importance to investigators and as such
is the reason for the examination of the highly
adopted mapping applications listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Tested applications
Application

Android Vers.

iOS Vers.

Google Maps
Apple Maps
Waze
MapQuest
Bing Maps
Scout GPS

9.6.1
NA
3.9.3.0
2.7.7
5.2.0.20140710
2.5.1.0021

4.8.62649
8.3
3.2.9.1
4.8
5.4
2.1.1

organized, searchable, sortable, and easy to read
Excel file where all of the data related to these
applications can be found ii) eliminating the need
to have a person with the expertise needed to
decode/translate certain files to a human readable format, and iii) removing the need for an
investigator to manually search through a device’s forensic image to locate and extract evidence. The tool also contributes a framework
to the digital forensics community that can easily be built upon to include new versions of the
tested applications as well as any new mapping
applications released in the future.
In the remainder of the paper we first discuss
related work in Sec. 2. We then describe our
methodology in Sec. 3. We later share our findings of the artifacts found from the various mapping applications in Sec. 4. The constructed extensible SNAVP tool is then described in Sec. 5.
We lastly present future work and limitations in
Sec. 6 and conclusions in Sec. 7.

2.
At the time of writing this paper, literature
on the forensics of smartphone mapping applications was sparse. Our work aimed at filling the
gap in the scientific literature.
Our research informs practitioners, researchers
and the digital forensics community at large on
methods of extracting data from the applications
in Table 2. It identified the digital forensic artifacts that can be found by analyzing each of these
applications and resulted in a tool that can be
used to analyze potential digital evidence from
the applications.
Manual retrieval of data from these applications would take a considerable amount of time
and expertise. Not all of the files associated with
these applications can be opened and read by human eyes. Some files need to be decoded, some
have no structure making them difficult to follow,
and certain files contain data of interest which is
hidden amongst an immense amount of irrelevant
data.
Smart NAVigation Parser (SNAVP), the tool
constructed during this research (see Sec. 5),
combats all of these issues by i) outputting an
Page 16

2.1

RELATED WORK

Hand-held satellite navigation
devices

Research has been conducted in the area of
hand-held satellite navigation devices such as
Garmins, TomToms, and Magellans (Van Eijk
& Roeloffs, 2010; Arbelet, 2014). Past work illustrated the importance of the digital evidence
that could be extracted from these devices such
as where the user has been, how they got there,
who owns them, favorite addresses, etc. (Last,
2009). Evidence such as this may lead to a
number of important discoveries during investigations including behavioral profiles of those who
have used the device (Colombini, Colella, Castiglione, & Scognamiglio, 2012).
Notwithstanding, satellite navigation devices
are being replaced by smartphone mapping applications. Garmin reported a company worth
less than a third of its value in 2007 as well a 15
percent reduction in sales in 2013 (Leber, 2013).
Much of this drop was accredited to the increasing ubiquity of smartphones and the usage of the
mapping applications on them replacing Global
Positioning System (GPS) devices.
c 2017 ADFSL
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Table 2: Application features
Application

Navigation

Directions

Chatting

ETA

Home/Work Address

Favorites

Location Sharing

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
-

Google Maps
Apple Maps
Waze
MapQuest
Bing Maps
Scout GPS

2.2

Mobile phone forensics

McMillan et al. (2013) conducted a survey which
found that calls and Short Message Service
(SMS) data held the most evidential importance
during investigations, however, user and application data were also found to be of high importance. Much of the work in the mobile forensics
domain has focused on discovering these types of
data on various Operating Systems (Hoog, 2011;
Casey, Bann, & Doyle, 2010; Simão, Sı́coli, Melo,
Deus, & Sousa Júnior, 2011).
For instance, Al Mutawa, Baggili, and Marrington (2012) investigated the forensic artifacts that could be extracted from different social media applications such as Facebook, Twitter and MySpace. Furthermore, researchers
such as Mahajan, Dahiya, and Sanghvi (2013)
and Thing, Ng, and Chang (2010) examined
what digital forensic artifacts could be recovered from different messaging services and applications such as WhatsApp and Viber. Newer
studies focused on examining the network forensic implications of similar social-messaging applications (Karpisek, Baggili, & Breitinger, 2015;
Walnycky, Baggili, Marrington, Moore, & Breitinger, 2015).
Maus, Höfken, and Schuba (2011) conducted
a study concerning geodata on Android phones
where they used geodata from all applications on
a device which stored location data in an attempt
to provide the investigator with a viewable map
of where the user had been.
However, retrieving data from mobile devices
has comes with several challenges for researchers
and investigators (Bennett, 2012). The nature of smartphones, the Central Processing
c 2017 ADFSL

Unit (CPU) architecture, their processing and
memory resources, as well as the sheer number of used Operating Systems (OS), severely
complicates the forensic acquisition and analysis of these devices (Barmpatsalou, Damopoulos,
Kambourakis, & Katos, 2013).
The process gets more complex when one takes
into account the high rate of change in the mobile
field (new applications, application versions, OS
versions, etc.), the number of different devices
that are in use, and the lack of software, hardware and interface standardization (Lessard &
Kessler, 2010; Baggili, Mislan, & Rogers, 2007).
Casey and Stellatos (2008) also noted that encryption of the data on these devices is becoming more prevalent having notable implications
on digital forensic investigations. These challenges present investigators and researchers with
a difficult task whenever a mobile device is being
examined.
2.2.1

Android forensics

The challenges posed by Android devices stem
from the wide array of versions the platform supports. Many developers and companies put their
own twist on the platform when releasing their
devices leading to every device/Android version
combination to possess unique characteristics. A
minor difference in the Android version may require extensive testing and validation of tools before they can be deemed forensically sound on a
given system (Hoog, 2011).
Android forensics is an active area of research. For example, Vidas, Zhang, and Christin
(2011) focused on developing a general collection
methodology for the vast amount of Android devices. Distefano, Me, and Pace (2010), however,
Page 17

JDFSL V12N1

Find me if you can: Mobile GPS mapping ...

focused on discovering different anti-forensic
methods used on Android devices. Albano, Castiglione, Cattaneo, and De Santis (2011) developed a technique that provided the ability to
modify and erase, securely and selectively, digital evidence on an Android device using simple
software tools that are commonly seen on *nixlike operating systems such as Android.
The analysis of phone memory has also been
of importance to Android forensics as valuable
data such as passwords, text messages, etc. may
be contained within the memory (Thing et al.,
2010). Many tools have been created to aid in
this process.
Several plugins for Volatility – an advanced
memory forensics framework – were created to
read data such as passwords, chat messages, user
names, and e-mail (Macht, 2013). Sylve, Case,
Marziale, and Richard (2012) designed a kernel
module for dumping memory that addressed the
difficulties in developing device-independent acquisition tools while Leppert (2012) focused on
acquiring and analyzing heap-dumps of Android
applications.
2.2.2

iOS forensics

Breaking the security barriers of the newer versions of iOS devices so that physical images may
be acquired without jailbreaking the device has
become increasingly difficult (Belenko & Sklyarov, 2011). Jailbreaking involves removing restrictions on the device so that a physical image may be acquired, however, this process alters data on the device itself possibly tainting
its forensic value. One would have to know that
none of the user data was altered and that the
exact alteration of any other data on the device
be known for an acquisition method to be considered forensically sound.
The difficulty of acquiring a physical image of
an iOS device has made other extraction methods more prominent when dealing with newer
iOS devices. A common approach leverages
the iPhone backup files created with the iTunes
backup utility (Bader & Baggili, 2010; Morrissey
& Campbell, 2010). This method only acquires
data that has been synchronized by the backup
protocol, but as stated by Hoog and Strzempka
Page 18

(2011) most of the allocated data can be retrieved using this method. This method was determined to be the premier method for logical
acquisition for iOS devices (Tso, Wang, Huang,
& Wang, 2012). Another often used approach is
logical extraction. This procedure extracts active folders and files directly from the iPhone,
but does not retrieve any data from the unallocated space.

3.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this research followed
the guidelines for forensically examining artifacts
presented by NIST (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, &
Dang, 2006). The smartphones that were used
in our examination were a Samsung S4 Active
(SGH-i537) running Android version 4.4.2 and
an iPhone 4s Model A1387 running iOS 8.2. Towards the end of the research, the Samsung S4
Active stopped turning on and could no longer
be used, therefore, a Samsung Galaxy S4 Zoom
(SM-C101) running Android version 4.4.2 was
used when investigating Google Maps and Bing.
Our research methodology was broken into
three phases data creation and acquisition
(Sec. 3.1), data analysis (Sec. 3.2), and tool creation (Sec. 3.3). The high level methodology is
portrayed in Fig. 1.

3.1

Phase I: data creation and
acquisition

Several actions were performed on each application. These actions were chosen based on the features of each application shown in Table 2. Each
action was recorded and logged so that any data
on the mobile device resulting from the given action could be discerned.
The devices were acquired using .XRY 1 . .XRY
is software which forensically extracts data from
a variety of mobile devices. A device image was
acquired after each entry shown in Table 3. The
Samsung S4 Active and the Samsung Galaxy S4
Zoom were physically acquired, while all of the
images of the iPhone 4S were logical due to physical acquisition of the iPhone 4s not being sup1

Micro Systemation AB (MSAB), https://www.msab
.com/, last accessed 2015-09-29
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Table 3: Actions performed
#

Recorded action

1
2

A fresh install of the application
A location was inserted into the application and traveled to
A location was inserted into the application and not traveled to
Application specific features such as
sending messages, sharing locations,
etc.

3
4

Figure 1: High level methodology for Android
and iOS
ported by any tools at the time of conducting the
acquisition.
We note that although we used different acquisition methods on the devices, our work’s
scope focused on the allocated space, making
the method of extraction not as significant as
it would be had any of the data discovered was
found in unallocated space.

3.2

Phase II: data analysis

Analysis of the acquired forensic images was
completed using a variety of tools. .XRY and
Cellebrite were used to mount and explore the
acquired images to discover files related to the
tested applications.
Once files were identified, several tools were
utilized to inspect the file contents. WinHex 2 , a
universal hexidecimal editor, was used to identify
file headers and inspect the content of files that
2

http://www.x-ways.net/winhex/,
2015-11-23
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last

accessed

were not recognized by .XRY.
DB Browser for SQLite3 is a visual open source
tool that allows for the creation, design, editing,
and viewing of database files that are compatible
with SQLite. This tool was used to explore the
contents of any SQlite database encountered.
XML files were inspected with Sublime Text, a
text editor for code, markup, and prose 4 , while
any binary plist files encountered were inspected
using a combination of Xcode 7, a powerful IDE
5 , and the Terminal.

3.3

Phase III: Smart Navigation
Parser (SNAVP)

SNAVP, the tool created during this research was
designed to parse out as much of the data as possible that was found based on our findings. It
was designed as a command line tool with modularity and extensiblity in mind so that additional parsers may be added it to it at any time.
SNAVP is discussed in further detail in Sec. 5.

4.

RESULTS

This section describes the results of the artifacts
found in detail. For a summary of the artifacts
found, refer to Table 5 and Table 6.
3

http://sqlitebrowser.org/, last accessed 2015-12-

09
4
http://www.sublimetext.com/, last accessed 201512-07
5
https://developer.apple.com/xcode/, last accessed 2015-11-20
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Google Maps - Android

Google Maps contained four files of evidentiary
value: da destination history, search history.db,
com.google.android.apps.maps preferences.xml,
and DATA SYNC DATA.
da destination history was a SQLite database
file that contained location data related to the
starting and ending locations that the user selected to retrieve directions to. In order for data
to be present in this database the user had to
have selected navigate after entering in locations.
search history.db, another SQLite database,
held the user’s search data. This meant that
navigation was not necessary for data to appear
in this database, the data was entered as soon as
the user searched for any location within Google
Maps.
com.google.android.apps.maps preferences.xml
was an XML file that contained the user’s
preferences and more specifically the last user
account name to use Google Maps.
DATA SYNC DATA contained cloud data
based on the user account that was using the
application. So, for example, if a user had saved
a search using a different device, that location
would be found in this file so that it could be
used on any device as long as the user was signed
into Google Maps.

4.2

Google Maps - iOS

No data that related to the user’s searches, navigation, or saved locations were found on the
iPhone, however, the file com.google.Maps.plist
did include the user’s last known location along
with what seemed to be other files of interest. In
com.google.Maps.plist was a reference to a plist
file called 1436530344726.plist. The name of the
plist file, 1436530344726, was in the form of a
Unix timestamp that converted to July 10, 8:12
AM EST, the time at which the last search occurred while using Google Maps.

4.3

Apple Maps

Only one file, GeoHistory.mapsdata, was found
to contain data related to the user’s actions in
Apple Maps. GeoHistory.mapsdata was a plist
file that held data pertaining to what the user
had searched for within the application as well as
Page 20

Yelp reviews for the given locations if applicable.

4.4

Waze - Android

The files waze log.txt, user.db, tiles nt.db, and
tts.db were found to hold data related to the
user’s activity while using the Waze application.
waze log.txt contained an immense amount of
data. The file was separated into active sessions
which were defined as the time from when the
user had opened the Waze application to when
they closed out of it. Three different actions
were found to cause a RoutingRequest within this
file i) when a route was requested by the user
ii) when GPS signal was lost and then found
again during navigation, and iii) when rerouting
occurred during navigation. A RoutingRequest
contained a starting and ending location in the
form of latitude and longitude points for the requested route, and the two lines directly above
each RoutingRequest contained a timestamp and
current location of the user.
user.db was a SQLite database that contained
a plethora of data including the destination the
user had received directions to, the time at which
the directions were requested, and the Estimated
Time of Arrivals (ETAs) that were sent or received. It is critical to note that the data mentioned appeared in the database at the time navigation was selected within Waze; meaning that
there was no way to discern whether the user had
actually traveled to the destination form the data
found in this database.
tiles nt.db was a SQLite database that contained data which related to images of the pieces
of maps that were needed for navigation sessions.
An approach to relate the entries in this database
to the many locations that were navigated to was
not discovered and warrants future research.
tts.db was another SQLite database. It held
paths to the audio direction files that were used
during navigation, i.e. turn right, continue
straight, etc. However, a way to link the entries
in this table to specific navigation sessions was
not found.
Waze uniquely had the feature of sending and
receiving messages to other users. The messages
that were sent and received were not found on
the device, however, prior research by Storozuk
c 2017 ADFSL
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(2014) found that the messages could be found
in the device’s memory.

4.5

Waze - iOS

The only file found on the logical image of the
iPhone was user.db. This SQLite database had
the exact same structure and data as its Android
counterpart (see Sec. 4.4).

4.6

MapQuest - Android

A SQLite database named search.db contained
all of the data pertaining to the places that the
user navigated to while using MapQuest. Three
fields within the search table were found to hold
the most importance in this research.
Two fields contained UNIX timestamps. The
ctime field referred to when the user had
searched for directions, while the atime field referred to the time that MapQuest actually retrieved the directions that were queried.
The third field was titled json and was a json
field that contained the address and longitude
and latitude coordinates of the destination along
with a userInput key that held the text that the
user had actually searched for.

4.7

MapQuest - iOS

The data that related to the user’s navigation
history while using MapQuest was found in the
file com.aol.mapquest.plist. This plist file contained data such as latitude and longitude coordinates and addresses of destinations searched
for or marked as a favorite by the user. However, there were no timestamps associated with
these entries and the data structure was the same
whether the destination was actually traveled to
or not.

4.8

Bing Maps

Bing Maps was unique in that it was not a stand
alone mapping application; the Bing Maps segment was just a part of the overall Bing application. As the purpose of this research was to
test mapping applications, only the Bing Maps
portion of the application was tested. Further,
Bing had the option to search privately, and if
the user was in private mode, Bing claimed that
the users search history would not be stored by
the application.
c 2017 ADFSL
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4.8.1

Bing Maps - Android

A single SQLite database file, SearchHistoryDatabase.db, held the user’s search history when
private browsing was not enabled. It had a simple structure of three tables with the table of interest being SearchHistory. The NAME field in
this table referred to the text that was searched
for and the LAST field correlated with the time
that the search occurred.
4.8.2

Bing Maps - iOS

The iOS version of Bing was found to hold several files that contained data regarding the actions performed by the user, a History.plist file
along with multiple *.dat files.
History.plist contained the search history of
the user as long as private searching was not enabled. Any search that occurred while private
searching was enabled did not result in an entry in Historys.plist. For an entry to be made
here, the location had to be searched for using
the search bar of the Bing Maps application. If
the “get directions” icon was pressed prior to
searching for a location then that location would
not appear in Historys.plist.
The *.dat files, where the * represents an integer value, were found at two locations. The nonprivate version of the *.dat file was stored in the
Documents/Journal directory. This directory
did not exist until a search had occurred within
the application, while the private version of these
files were stored in the Documents/PriJournal
directory, and similar to the non-private version,
the PriJournal directory did not exist until a
search had occurred when privacy was enabled.
It was found that the highest numbered *.dat
file contained data on the most recent location
that was searched by the user, with or without
private browsing enabled.

4.9

Scout - Android

Two files were found which contained data
deemed of evidentiary value, a SQLite database
named scoutAppDatabase.db and an XML file titled Route *.
scoutAppDatabase.db contained eight tables
that held data pertaining to the user’s actions
while using Scout. This included members of
Page 21
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chat sessions, the messages themselves, configuration data, the address along with the longitude and latitude coordinates of locations that
were navigated to, and usernames of friends of
the user.
A different Route * file was created each time
a location was navigated to where the * was replaced by the UNIX timestamp of when the navigation session was first created. Within the file
was detailed information about every route that
was offered to the user for a given destination
and also specified the exact route that the user
had chosen. Each route was broken up into segments, thereby allowing one to reconstruct each
given route by combining their respective segments.
Unfortunately, in both files, the location data
was created at the time that navigation was requested, making it difficult to discern whether
the user had actually traveled to the destination.

4.10

Scout - iOS

Only
one
plist
file,
namely
com.telenav.scout.push store.log was found
to hold data related to user’s navigation, however, the data within this file was incomplete.
For example, the file held the UNIX timestamp
of when the navigation was started and only
the final direction of the navigation session, i.e.
in one of the test scenarios, the only direction
found was “Turn left to Ruden St” (the final
direction before the user would reach their
actual destination). Because of this, the sequence of actions performed on the iOS device
were completed several times as to ensure that
the lack of data was not caused by an error,
but still, only incomplete data was found in
com.telenav.scout.pushstore.log.
Our findings helped us construct the basis for
a parser for all of these applications which we
discuss in the Sec. 5 that follows.

5.

SMART NAVIGATION
PARSER (SNAVP)

In its initial release, SNAVP was designed as a
command line tool that took one required parameter and one optional parameter. The rePage 22

quired parameter was signified by a -i and took
the location of the input, i.e. a file, a directory,
a device image, a zip file etc., as an argument.
The optional parameter was signified by a -o and
was the location where the program would write
its output to. If no argument was provided for
the output location, the output defaulted to the
current working directory.
After the input was received, the program proceeded to determine the nature of the input, i.e.
whether it is a tar file, an image file, a single file,
or a directory. The type of input determined the
next steps, a tar file would have to be unpacked,
an image would have have to be mounted, etc.,
however, we note that not all image files were
mountable (see Sec. 6). Each file in the input
was then iterated over and had its file header or
extension checked to determine if it was a file of
interest.
A file of interest was defined as a binary plist
(bplist), a sqlite database, a text file, or an XML
file. These were all of the file types from the
tested applications that were found to hold digital evidence of forensic value. If a file was of interest, the parsers would run their validity check
against the file, and if passed, the parser would
then parse the file and send the parsed data back
to the main program where it would be written
out to an Excel file.
The first sheet of every Excel file, titled
Parsers Ran (see Figure 2), lists the parsers that
were run on the input given, provide the file path
to the file that they were run on and the color
of the marks for each respective application that
can be seen on the All Applications Map (Figure 3). The data retrieved from each individual
parser was contained on its own respective sheet
within the created Excel document.

5.1

Program structure

The first file shown in Figure 4 is ParseControl.py. This file controlled the overall program.
It received the user’s input, ran the necessary
parsers, collected the data, created the map files,
and wrote it all out to an Excel file.
The Dependencies folder contained three key
elements of SNAVP. FileCheck.py determined
whether or not a given file was of the type txt,
c 2017 ADFSL
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Figure 2: First sheet of SNAVP output

Figure 3: All applications map
sqlite, plist, or xml. This was determined by
using the file header and/or the file extension.
The action of Mount.py is determined by the input that was given. If the input was an image
file, Mount.py would attempt to mount the file
so that its contents could be read. If the input
was a tar or zip file, it would extract the data
to a given folder so that it may be read, etc.
WorksheetData.py contained the WorksheetData
class. This class was used to store the data from
the individual parsers in a manner that ParseControl.py could interpret.
The Parsers folder contained all of the individual parsers that could be executed. As mentioned in Sec. 3.3, SNAVP was designed in a
modular manner. To add a new parser to the
tool, one would only have to add the parser file
to this folder, and add the file name to the init.py
file. As long as the parser created followed the
WorksheetData class, it would be correctly intec 2017 ADFSL

Figure 4: SNAVP structure
grated into SNAVP.

5.2

Dependencies

• The Sleuth Kit - is a C library along with
a collection of command line tools that allow the analysis of disk images. Many tools,
such as Autopsy, use The Sleuth Kit behind
the scenes 6 . SNAVP used The Sleuth Kit
to mount image files and extract files of in6

The Sleuth Kit (TSK), http://www.sleuthkit.org/,
last accessed 2015-09-29
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terest so that they may be parsed.
• pytsk3 - is a Python package that is a
Python binding for The Sleuth Kit 7 . This
allowed SNAVP to programmatically mount
images so that they could be searched to determine if any files of interest resided on the
image. Those files were then extracted and
parsed if applicable.
• pygmaps - is another Python package that is
a Python wrapper for Google Maps 8 . This
provided SNAVP with the capability to generate HTML files that plot given coordinates
on Google Maps.
• ccl-bplist - is a Python module that helps
deal with binary plist files (bplists) 9 .
SNAVP utilized this module when attempting to parse any bplists that it encountered.
• XlsxWriter - is a Python module that allowed the creation of Excel XLSX files 10 .
This module was used to organize and produce the parsed data into an Excel workbook in a meaningful manner.

6.

LIMITATIONS & FUTURE
WORK

The rate at which new versions of applications
are released is overwhelming. SNAVP was tested
on the specific application versions shown in Table 1. This does not mean it will not work on
other versions, however, it is possible that new
and old versions of these applications have different file names, schemas for their files, etc. To
combat this challenge SNAVP was created in a
modular manner so that new parsers may be
added to support any new or old versions of the
tested applications as well as any additional GPS
applications.
7
pytsk3, https://github.com/py4n6/pytsk, last accessed 2015-09-29
8
pygmaps, https://code.google.com/p/pygmaps/,
last accessed 2015-09-29
9
ccl-bplist,
https://code.google.com/p/
ccl-bplist/, last accessed 2015-09-29
10
XlsxWriter, http://xlsxwriter.readthedocs.org/,
last accessed 2015-09-29
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It is also important to note that the data that
all of these applications were tested with was
minimal in comparison to real data. The tool
may error out on larger sets of data as not all possibilities could be accounted for with such small
sets of test data.
When a device image file was used as input,
not all of the images were mountable. For example, .XRY used a proprietary file type .xry that
caused the program to error out when attempting to mount the image. Therefore, any image
file that could not be mounted resulted in the
user having to manually locate and extract the
files of interest, then use the directory that the
files were placed in as the input to the tool.
All of the latitude longitude points mapped
by SNAVP were only accurate within the United
States. Many of the applications did not put
the decimal point in the latitude or longitude
coordinate when it was saved; SNAVP had to
perform this action. The decimal points vary in
location depending on the actual latitude or longitude, therefore, the tool only guaranteed accuracy when it placed the decimal point for locations that were in the United States.

7.

CONCLUSION

An immense amount of potential digital evidence
related to the examined applications were discovered during this research (summarized in Table 5 and Table 6). This data could hold great
evidentiary value during different types of investigations. The timestamps combined with the
current locations in Waze can place users in certain vicinities at certain times thereby corroborating a story or an alibi. Knowing the route
that a user had taken (data from the Scout application) can be used to locate evidence the suspect may have dropped along a route or locate
cameras that may be used to track a suspect.
Table 4 rates the tested applications, 1 being
highest and 10 being lowest, on the determined
forensic value that they hold. The rankings are
relative to each other and are a reflection on
the amount and the type of data that was ascertained from each application during this research. It is important to note that none of the
c 2017 ADFSL
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data mentioned in this work was found in unallocated space on the devices.
Table 4: Determined forensic value ranking of
applications
Forensic value
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Application
Waze (Android)
Scout (Android)
Google Maps (Android)
Waze (iOS)
MapQuest (Android)
Bing (iOS)
MapQuest (iOS)
Apple Maps
Google Maps (iOS)
Scout (iOS)

The Android version of Waze topped the list.
In addition to the starting and ending navigational points, it was found to periodically store
the current location of the user. Scout for Android was next, it was found to store all of the
routes given to the user for a navigation session
along with the route that was chosen by the user.
It also contained messages that were sent between users on the application. Google Maps was
ranked third because it stored the starting and
ending location of provided routes. Only the top
rated applications provided a starting location.
Applications ranked 4 through 6 were all similar as they provided data about the locations
that were searched for or navigated to. Notwithstanding, they did not provide starting locations.
MapQuest for iOS and Apple Maps were ranked
7th and 8th respectively. They both provided
data on the user’s search and navigation history
but they did not store any timestamps with the
data making it difficult to determine a timeline
for the user. Google Maps for iOS ranked slightly
ahead of Scout due to being able to determine the
user’s last location right before exiting Google
Maps. The iOS version of Scout came in last
as almost no data that related to the locations
searched for or navigated to were found on the
device. Note that the Android version of Bing is
not listed in Table 4 since it could not be fully
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examined during this research.
The downfall to the data that was found on
the devices was that actual travel was never required for data to be saved. Most of the tested
applications stored their data when it was either
searched for or navigated to. This could hurt
cases as the user cannot be placed at a particular point or on a particular route without some
other form of corroborating evidence. Again, the
Android version of Waze was the only application
that was found to store the user’s current location at different times; this data was found in
Waze’s log file. To combat this challenge, future
work could attempt to correlate GPS locations
from multiple devices, as well as GPS log data
from the OS with the ones found from the studied applications.
As mentioned in Sec. 2, valuable data was
found on handheld navigation devices such as
TomToms and Magellans. In fact, the data found
was very similar to that which was found in this
study. As with the data found on the smartphones, data such as locations entered to, home,
work, and favorite addresses could be found on
handheld navigation devices, however, there was
one immense benefit gained from the data found
on handheld navigation devices as opposed to
the data found on smartphones. With handheld
navigation devices one was able to differentiate
whether a location in the GPS was actually traveled to (Nutter, 2008).
Although being able to differentiate between
these two circumstances may be of importance,
the rest of the mapping data found on the smartphones was decidedly similar to that found on
handheld navigation devices. Thus, as it has
been discussed by Strawn (2009) that GPS devices have helped prosecutors win cases, one may
argue that the mapping data found on the smartphones during this research would still be of
paramount importance during investigations.
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Table 5: Android - summary of results
Application

File

Google Maps

da destination history

Google Maps

Google Maps

Waze

Waze

MapQuest

Bing

Scout

Scout

Page 28

Description

SQLite database that contained
data related to navigations that occurred within Google Maps
search history.db
SQLite database that contained
data related to searches that occurred within Google Maps
DATA SYNC DATA
Contained data from the user’s account that did not take place on the
given device or took place prior to
Google Maps being uninstalled
waze log.txt
Text file that contained location
data related to routes selected by
the user and their current locations
user.db
SQLite database that contained
data related to navigations selected
by the user
search.db
SQLite database that contained
data related to the navigation history of the user
SearchHistoryDatabase.dbSQLite database that contained
user search history when private
browsing was disabled
scoutAppDatabase.db
SQLite database that contained
navigation and messaging data related to the user
Route *
XML file that contained the different routes for navigation sessions,
the * represented the unix timestamp of the start of the respective
navigation session
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Table 6: iOS - summary of results
Application

File

Apple Maps

GeoHistory.mapsdata

Waze

MapQuest
Bing
Bing

Bing

Scout
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Description

Plist file that contained data related
to the user’s search history
user.db
SQLite database that contained
data related to navigations selected
by the user
com.aol.mapquest.plist
Plist file that contained navigation
data relating to the user
Historys.plist
Plist file that contained data that
pertained to user searches
*.dat (Non-private browsing) Plist file that contained data on the
most recent search, the * represented an integer value
*.dat (Private browsing)
Plist file that contained data on the
most recent private search, the *
represented an integer value
com.telenav.scout.pushstore.log Plist file that contained incomplete
navigational data
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